 At Mount Ararat 2014 New Things and Old Things Like New AgainThere is more going on these days than could be imagined. Rather dream-like if the truth be told.
A new baby (my first). A new novel (my third). My wife still loves me, my family still puts up with me, and the writing is going well. What is there, really, to complain about? There is a big difference between being a writer and being a writer with a child. I see that now. Every sentence counts now in a way it did not before. Not in a creative way, no, I do not mean like that. Creatively, every sentence has always mattered. Creatively speaking, every sentence is all there is. The succession of sentences and structure is all that matters. What I mean is that every sentence counts from an output perspective. It becomes a matter of "So, you still wanna write for a living? It's easy to live on the sly when you are single and flexible, not so much with wife and child. SO, if you wanna write and make this a career, then you need to produce. You need ideas on paper and you need to refine them. You need more words and more ideas and more preciseness, more energy, less tell and more show.
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 WRITER TO WRITER: INTERVIEW WITH DAVID EDWARD WAGNER Here is the complete interview David Edward Wagner recently did with the website "131 Preview Review" with author and site curator SI Hayes. Enjoy! SI: Welcome to the 131 Preview Review! I'm excited to have you here! I hope you've had a good day. I understand you are currently in Istanbul, Turkey. David: My day was good. Just getting some things done and trying to keep up with the never-ending work load. And yes, I am in Istanbul, for about three years now. SI: I understand you are quite busy. The interview is pretty straight froward, we'll chat a bit about the work I've read, and segue into other things you have been doing. David: Great no problem, I am really happy to do it. Thanks for taking the time. SI: Oh no problem, I love to read and this Review blog gives me such an opportunity to meet the authors it's a thrill for me. I really did enjoy "Marvelous Things" it was truly thought provoking. David: Cool, thank you. It was interesting to write, so i was hoping some of my own questions rubbed off on the reader. hopefully with just enough action/suspense to drag you along. SI: It was quite suspenseful, I wanted to pull my hair out with Lt. Abbott around the middle. LOL David: Haha, good. that means I was doing my job, right? Updates, Insights, and What's Up Lately... Hello, howdy, and merhaba. It has been a busy and productive period here at David Wagner Media's secret headquarters. Well, okay, you got me, 'secret headquarters' may be a little overdramatic. In all actuality, I have been moving back and forth between my little Istanbul apartment and a couple of cafés I regularly write and edit at. But, to clarify, yes indeed have I been both busy and productive. On the personal side, my lovely wife and I are expecting our first child any week now. So that pretty much takes any cake conceivable. Very excited and ready to see the little tyke after these nine long months of watching him grow and kick around inside of my wife. Mentally preparing myself for sleepless nights, poopy diapers, and a constant barrage of the unexpected. I can't wait. On the creative/business side of things:
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 Relational Materialsim and Citizen X Chapter Three - Part Five In Part Four, I brought in three elements crucial to the development of the remainder of this blog series. Those elements are: Resistance, Deontic Power, and Biopower. In Part Five, I will continue exploring these elements. A shift of power Until the coming of Enlightenment values and industrial capabilities, the general forms of western political power were ‘monarchal’ and ‘aristocratic:’ the power of kings: the oppressive and domineering power that gave the sovereign authority “le droit de fait mourir ou laisser vivre.”[1] Monarchal and Aristocratic power entail explicit control, where the sovereign authority has direct, justified access to the bodies, lives, and opportunities of his subjects. In this context, political power was considered the sole possession of a lone sovereign or ruling class. Current philosophical inquiries into the subject, following Foucault, have to admit to a shifting in the locus of political power. With the growing specialization, consolidation, and cohesion of industrial, political, and economic systems, the traditional concept of ‘power as sovereign’ fails to hold. No longer confined to the simple form of an absolute ruler, the paradigm and structural mechanisms of sovereignty have become embedded in and internal to the social system itself. Modern sovereignty, says Foucault, is embodied in “more-or-less organized, hierarchical, coordinated cluster[s] of relations.”[2] |
Relational Materialism
and Citizen X
Chapter Three - Part Four
In Part Three, I began defining ‘Power’ and ‘power’ and mentioned that individual agents have the capacity for action, their own personal power, but the ability to exercise this power is a matter of contingent degree.
Any expression of power faces resistance from its relation with the external world, and this fact brings limitations to expressions of intentional action.
Limits to personal power, then, also function to limit personal autonomy.
The relation between power and autonomy and a few definitions
I spoke of autonomy at some length in Chapter Two, but it important to recap and renew that previous conversation.
Autonomy, from the Greek auto meaning ‘self’ and nomos, ‘law’ or ‘rule,’ describes the individual’s capacity to maintain authority over the directions, choices, and actions that concern her life.
The core notion of autonomy is “self-authority,” that is, the ability to decide and act in accordance with one’s own choices, without deferring to or confirming those choices with any authority higher than one’s own.
Among traits Marina Oshana lists (and I endorse) as necessary for self-authority, are “reasonably astute cognitive skills and a developed set of values,[1]” as well as “certain psychological characteristics and a history of experiences conducive to self-directed agency.[2]”
These characteristics frame autonomy as a relation of constitutive social forces and degrees of personal disposition, development, and recognized authoritative opportunity.
In distinguishing autonomy from freedom, Marina Oshana says, “To be free is to possess the power to decide or to act, but autonomy deals with agential authority over those decisions and actions.[3]”
Autonomy is closely bound with “authority,” which I understand as “power that acquires legitimization.” In other words, an authority is an agent who holds legitimate power over one or more other agents, including her own “self.”
Another definition necessary to restate is that of ‘agency.’ I understand “agency” as the capacity to make and impose choices in the world; an agent is one who acts.
This action, as fundamentally a capacity, is ontologically based in the phenomenological subject, the individual, the “agent” who may only act to the extent that she is able to with self-deliberation and empowerment.
Ideally, an “agent” maintains the capacity to express her personal power with no limitations and with complete self-authored deliberation. However, as I have taken pains to mention and explain, practical limitations to “agency” exist in the simple fact of physical and social reality.
Acknowledgement of these empirical conditions negates the usefulness of ideal theories, requiring practical theory to base itself in material paradigms such as my proposed model of Relational Materialism.
The relation between power and resistance
The concept of resistance is vital to my overall project.
In upcoming chapters of this blog series I will be returning often to resistance so for now, I want to quickly bring the idea into play and offer a short description of how resistance functions in relation with power. It will be discussed in greater detail as we move forward.
First, Foucault claims that resistance is internal to the exercise of power, a dynamic part of the action. Of resistances, Foucault writes, “They are the odd term in relations of power; they are inscribed in the latter as an irreducible opposite.”[4]
I understand this to mean that resistance is found in the relation itself, at points of instantiation when an agent intentionally utilizes her capacity to act.
What I mean is this:
Where the technical term “Power” deals with the internal experience of Citizen X, the basic experience of being ‘in’ an external world, the concept of “power” contains both internal and external aspects, it is our common, colloquial notion of being able to act in the material world and the ability to effect the objects we encounter.
In every case, power is in relationship with resistance so as to facilitate tangible actions, the capacity and/or the ability to do something in the physical world.
This implies some degree of relationship between objects, as the concepts “power to” and “power over” tell us that there is a form of resistance that is being overcome.
My initial definition of ‘resistance’ is: “The impeding or opposing effect executed by one material thing upon another.” This definition will evolve as the discussion continues in future chapters, but for now it is enough to move on.
Moving On: The Sociopolitical State
Resistant forces can be understood as environmental, other agents, the agent’s own materially-considered phenomenology (i.e. psychological and physical limitations), or most importantly for this blog, the sociopolitical state.
In this section, I will begin with a general definition of sociopolitical power, one endorsed by Iris Young. From this initial attempt, I will build my own definition of sociopolitical power based on a Relational Materialist model.
In general, the “sociopolitical” involves a combination of social and political factors, an idea found in Iris Marion Young’s claim that sociopolitical justice “concerns all aspects of institutional organization, public action, social practices and habits, and cultural meanings insofar as they are potentially subject to collective evaluation and decisionmaking.”[5]
Traditional descriptions of sociopolitical power, also described as “state” power, are in terms of the “sovereign,” a common and legitimate political authority.
According to this model, individual agents trade some degree of their “personal” power and autonomy, their “agency,” for the benefits of an organized and structured social system: protection, opportunities, creative and fulfilled lives free from the instabilities of non-political existence.
Hobbes describes such existence as the “state of nature,” while John Rawls hypothetically calls this the “original position.” In either case, what they are describing is conceptually equivalent: a model of human life without a political state or sovereign authority.
Models of human life without legitimate political authority are used to develop the idea that the fundamental relationship between individual agents and the political state must be justified.
I agree that this fundamental relationship must be not only justified, but continually maintained, an idea I will return to.
What I want to draw from this conception of an original state of nature is the idea that there is a fundamental relationship between individual agents and the political state that must be justified, legitimized, and maintained.
This relationship is based on recognized and accepted authority; political subjects, citizens, recognize the state’s authority over their lives and accept the benefits of political life, i.e. protection, law, increased opportunity for felicity or a “good life,” in trade for the necessary burdens of such arrangements. Burdens include restrictions, taxations, and limits to personal expression of power such as laws against stealing, yelling “fire” in theaters, traffic regulations, and so forth.
In the traditional context, political power was considered the sole possession of a lone sovereign or ruling class.
Current philosophical inquiries into the subject, following Foucault, have to admit to a shifting in the locus of political power.
There can be no legitimate discussion of a single authority guiding the mechanisms and apparatus of the State, the sources of power have become abstract, the major influential factors in a secular, capitalistic democracy too diverse, parasitic and demanding of one another to be thought of as one coherent entity.
With the growing specialization, consolidation, and cohesion of industrial, political, and economic systems, the traditional idea of ‘power as sovereign’ fails to hold.
No longer confined to the simple form of an absolute ruler, the paradigm and structural mechanisms of ‘power as sovereign’ has become embodied in and by the social system itself. Power is now everywhere, wrote Foucault, for “it comes from everywhere”. (Foucault, “History of Sexuality- volume 1”, pg 92-93)
Foucault realized that our modern society has developed such as to internalize two crucial mechanisms of ‘power as authority’, those of Surveillance and Exclusion, and the panorama of disciplines and controls that stem from these.
Its authority has moved beyond traditional limits as citizens have come to internalize the mechanisms and ideologies of state power, enacting the capacity of that external authority over themselves. Born from foundations of post-industrial, capital-driven politics, individual agents produce, reproduce, and are subject too, political authority, and enforce its power with their everyday actions, assumptions, relationships, and norms. We have become more than the ‘units’ of power’s application, Foucault says, we are ‘vehicles’ for its expression. (Foucault, “Power and Knowledge”, pg 544)
The idea of the ‘sovereign’, he writes, is enough to propagate its continual rebirth.
My initial definition of ‘power’ is “an agent’s (1) capacity to act, an internal potential that manifests in actuality as an (2) intentional action involving (3) a dynamic relationship with the external world. To this I must now add further points to encompass our relation to the modern political state.
The power of the common authority we enact has become (4) a net-like system that is (5) internalized by agents in dynamic relationship with their own personal power. I will develop these ideas further in upcoming chapters.
The Structure of Sociopolitical Power
Structurally and mechanically, contemporary sociopolitical power is exercised in three forms: Argumental/Persuasive,[6] Compulsive/Brute,[7] and Deontic/Structural. In this blog, I am concerned specifically with deontics.
Broadly, deontic power constructs the basic structural limits of the socio-political system, and enables an agent of power, be it state, individual, or group, a de facto authority, to get other agents to behave in desired ways without having to resort to actual physical coercion or force.
Searle writes that deontic power provides “desire-independent reasons for action.”[8] He means that on a practical level, the rights, restrictions, and duties imposed by the deontic structure of law and regulation produce, on the theoretical level, intentions to act that are not based on an agent’s own initial desires.
Stopping at a red light on an empty street when in a hurry is an easy example. One way relevant to this paper involves the agent of power getting the subject to actually want what the agent wants him to want, while a second way involves the agent getting the subject to only perceive certain courses of action as open, manipulating the subject’s subsequent actions and intentions.[9]
I have a problem with Searle’s idea of ‘desire-independent reasons for action’ and I will return to it in upcoming chapters.
I do, however, agree with his assessment that the contemporary sociopolitical state’s legitimacy and regulative force is, in Searle’s words, “intentionally-relative,” that is, “people’s attitudes are necessary to constitute something as money, government, political parties, or final examinations.”[10]
Political agents accept the benefits of political life, i.e. protection, law, increased opportunity for a “good life,” in trade for the necessary burdens of such arrangements, including the state’s authority over aspects of their lives.[11] Foucault writes, “What can the end of government be? Certainly not just to govern, but to improve the condition of the population…”[12]
The ability to carve the space for oneself to realize, develop, and exercise personal power is relative to one’s relationship and standing to the society at large. The more power one holds over their choices and movements, the better the chances to fulfill one’s own particular ‘good life’, an important concern in liberal discourse.
This “pastoral” state, with the population its flock, contains the mechanisms for large-scale discipline of the individual body, where conformation to the expectations of the state was linked to the well-being and advancement of both individuals and the general population; the state as the sole means to the best end.[13]
I will return to these ideas in the Part Five.
Two more definitions necessary for upcoming discussions
Allow me to briefly step back and offer two definitions that will become of growing importance as we move forward. This discussion evolves and moves quick in this blog format, so I do not want to risk letting these definitions slip through the cracks.
First, I will use the term ‘System’ to describe “a group of interacting, interrelated, or interdependent elements in relationship to each other as to form a complex whole”.
Second, ‘Economic’ is “the system concerned with the structure of production, distribution, exchange, and consumption of goods, services, and resources in a society, including finances, labor, and institutional relations”.
Thank you and I will see you again in Chapter Three, Parts Five and Six.
In Part Five, I will begin discussing this notions of the pastoral state and “biopower,” as well as offering my definition of sociopolitical power. Five will also lead us towards Iris Young and her rejection of distributive theories of power and justice. Her rejection forms the base of my own model of Relational Materialism.
Part Six will delve into Searle and answer to some objections I have with his conclusions.
Footnotes
[1] Oshana (2003) pg. 102
[2] ibid. pg. 101
[3] Oshana, 2008, pg. 199
[4] Foucault (1990) pp. 96
[5] Young (1990) pp. 9
[6] Slogans, propaganda, the food pyramid, political primaries, nationalistic rhetoric and symbols.
[7] Imprisonment, penalties, sanctions, the death penalty, military presence at social demonstrations.
[8] Searle (2010). pp. 23 “the glue to hold civilization together,”[8]
[9] See Searle (2010) and Lukes (2004) This ability to reflect upon first-order desires, and then to act upon consequent second-level reasons, is a trait particular to humans and “distinguishes language-based rationality from rationality that does not require language.” Searle, pp. 128
[10] Searle (2010) pp. 17
[11]Such burdens include regulations, taxations, and limits to personal expression of power such as laws against stealing, yelling “fire” in theaters, traffic fines, slander, and so forth.
[12] Foucault, 2004, pp. 105
[13] “And the instruments that government will use to obtain these ends are, in a way, immanent to the field of population; it will be by acting directly, on the population itself through campaigns, or, indirectly, by, for example, techniques that, without people being aware of it, stimulate the birth rate, or direct the flows of population to this or that region or activity.” (2204, pp. 105)
and Citizen X
Chapter Three - Part Four
In Part Three, I began defining ‘Power’ and ‘power’ and mentioned that individual agents have the capacity for action, their own personal power, but the ability to exercise this power is a matter of contingent degree.
Any expression of power faces resistance from its relation with the external world, and this fact brings limitations to expressions of intentional action.
Limits to personal power, then, also function to limit personal autonomy.
The relation between power and autonomy and a few definitions
I spoke of autonomy at some length in Chapter Two, but it important to recap and renew that previous conversation.
Autonomy, from the Greek auto meaning ‘self’ and nomos, ‘law’ or ‘rule,’ describes the individual’s capacity to maintain authority over the directions, choices, and actions that concern her life.
The core notion of autonomy is “self-authority,” that is, the ability to decide and act in accordance with one’s own choices, without deferring to or confirming those choices with any authority higher than one’s own.
Among traits Marina Oshana lists (and I endorse) as necessary for self-authority, are “reasonably astute cognitive skills and a developed set of values,[1]” as well as “certain psychological characteristics and a history of experiences conducive to self-directed agency.[2]”
These characteristics frame autonomy as a relation of constitutive social forces and degrees of personal disposition, development, and recognized authoritative opportunity.
In distinguishing autonomy from freedom, Marina Oshana says, “To be free is to possess the power to decide or to act, but autonomy deals with agential authority over those decisions and actions.[3]”
Autonomy is closely bound with “authority,” which I understand as “power that acquires legitimization.” In other words, an authority is an agent who holds legitimate power over one or more other agents, including her own “self.”
Another definition necessary to restate is that of ‘agency.’ I understand “agency” as the capacity to make and impose choices in the world; an agent is one who acts.
This action, as fundamentally a capacity, is ontologically based in the phenomenological subject, the individual, the “agent” who may only act to the extent that she is able to with self-deliberation and empowerment.
Ideally, an “agent” maintains the capacity to express her personal power with no limitations and with complete self-authored deliberation. However, as I have taken pains to mention and explain, practical limitations to “agency” exist in the simple fact of physical and social reality.
Acknowledgement of these empirical conditions negates the usefulness of ideal theories, requiring practical theory to base itself in material paradigms such as my proposed model of Relational Materialism.
The relation between power and resistance
The concept of resistance is vital to my overall project.
In upcoming chapters of this blog series I will be returning often to resistance so for now, I want to quickly bring the idea into play and offer a short description of how resistance functions in relation with power. It will be discussed in greater detail as we move forward.
First, Foucault claims that resistance is internal to the exercise of power, a dynamic part of the action. Of resistances, Foucault writes, “They are the odd term in relations of power; they are inscribed in the latter as an irreducible opposite.”[4]
I understand this to mean that resistance is found in the relation itself, at points of instantiation when an agent intentionally utilizes her capacity to act.
What I mean is this:
Where the technical term “Power” deals with the internal experience of Citizen X, the basic experience of being ‘in’ an external world, the concept of “power” contains both internal and external aspects, it is our common, colloquial notion of being able to act in the material world and the ability to effect the objects we encounter.
In every case, power is in relationship with resistance so as to facilitate tangible actions, the capacity and/or the ability to do something in the physical world.
This implies some degree of relationship between objects, as the concepts “power to” and “power over” tell us that there is a form of resistance that is being overcome.
My initial definition of ‘resistance’ is: “The impeding or opposing effect executed by one material thing upon another.” This definition will evolve as the discussion continues in future chapters, but for now it is enough to move on.
Moving On: The Sociopolitical State
Resistant forces can be understood as environmental, other agents, the agent’s own materially-considered phenomenology (i.e. psychological and physical limitations), or most importantly for this blog, the sociopolitical state.
In this section, I will begin with a general definition of sociopolitical power, one endorsed by Iris Young. From this initial attempt, I will build my own definition of sociopolitical power based on a Relational Materialist model.
In general, the “sociopolitical” involves a combination of social and political factors, an idea found in Iris Marion Young’s claim that sociopolitical justice “concerns all aspects of institutional organization, public action, social practices and habits, and cultural meanings insofar as they are potentially subject to collective evaluation and decisionmaking.”[5]
Traditional descriptions of sociopolitical power, also described as “state” power, are in terms of the “sovereign,” a common and legitimate political authority.
According to this model, individual agents trade some degree of their “personal” power and autonomy, their “agency,” for the benefits of an organized and structured social system: protection, opportunities, creative and fulfilled lives free from the instabilities of non-political existence.
Hobbes describes such existence as the “state of nature,” while John Rawls hypothetically calls this the “original position.” In either case, what they are describing is conceptually equivalent: a model of human life without a political state or sovereign authority.
Models of human life without legitimate political authority are used to develop the idea that the fundamental relationship between individual agents and the political state must be justified.
I agree that this fundamental relationship must be not only justified, but continually maintained, an idea I will return to.
What I want to draw from this conception of an original state of nature is the idea that there is a fundamental relationship between individual agents and the political state that must be justified, legitimized, and maintained.
This relationship is based on recognized and accepted authority; political subjects, citizens, recognize the state’s authority over their lives and accept the benefits of political life, i.e. protection, law, increased opportunity for felicity or a “good life,” in trade for the necessary burdens of such arrangements. Burdens include restrictions, taxations, and limits to personal expression of power such as laws against stealing, yelling “fire” in theaters, traffic regulations, and so forth.
In the traditional context, political power was considered the sole possession of a lone sovereign or ruling class.
Current philosophical inquiries into the subject, following Foucault, have to admit to a shifting in the locus of political power.
There can be no legitimate discussion of a single authority guiding the mechanisms and apparatus of the State, the sources of power have become abstract, the major influential factors in a secular, capitalistic democracy too diverse, parasitic and demanding of one another to be thought of as one coherent entity.
With the growing specialization, consolidation, and cohesion of industrial, political, and economic systems, the traditional idea of ‘power as sovereign’ fails to hold.
No longer confined to the simple form of an absolute ruler, the paradigm and structural mechanisms of ‘power as sovereign’ has become embodied in and by the social system itself. Power is now everywhere, wrote Foucault, for “it comes from everywhere”. (Foucault, “History of Sexuality- volume 1”, pg 92-93)
Foucault realized that our modern society has developed such as to internalize two crucial mechanisms of ‘power as authority’, those of Surveillance and Exclusion, and the panorama of disciplines and controls that stem from these.
Its authority has moved beyond traditional limits as citizens have come to internalize the mechanisms and ideologies of state power, enacting the capacity of that external authority over themselves. Born from foundations of post-industrial, capital-driven politics, individual agents produce, reproduce, and are subject too, political authority, and enforce its power with their everyday actions, assumptions, relationships, and norms. We have become more than the ‘units’ of power’s application, Foucault says, we are ‘vehicles’ for its expression. (Foucault, “Power and Knowledge”, pg 544)
The idea of the ‘sovereign’, he writes, is enough to propagate its continual rebirth.
My initial definition of ‘power’ is “an agent’s (1) capacity to act, an internal potential that manifests in actuality as an (2) intentional action involving (3) a dynamic relationship with the external world. To this I must now add further points to encompass our relation to the modern political state.
The power of the common authority we enact has become (4) a net-like system that is (5) internalized by agents in dynamic relationship with their own personal power. I will develop these ideas further in upcoming chapters.
The Structure of Sociopolitical Power
Structurally and mechanically, contemporary sociopolitical power is exercised in three forms: Argumental/Persuasive,[6] Compulsive/Brute,[7] and Deontic/Structural. In this blog, I am concerned specifically with deontics.
Broadly, deontic power constructs the basic structural limits of the socio-political system, and enables an agent of power, be it state, individual, or group, a de facto authority, to get other agents to behave in desired ways without having to resort to actual physical coercion or force.
Searle writes that deontic power provides “desire-independent reasons for action.”[8] He means that on a practical level, the rights, restrictions, and duties imposed by the deontic structure of law and regulation produce, on the theoretical level, intentions to act that are not based on an agent’s own initial desires.
Stopping at a red light on an empty street when in a hurry is an easy example. One way relevant to this paper involves the agent of power getting the subject to actually want what the agent wants him to want, while a second way involves the agent getting the subject to only perceive certain courses of action as open, manipulating the subject’s subsequent actions and intentions.[9]
I have a problem with Searle’s idea of ‘desire-independent reasons for action’ and I will return to it in upcoming chapters.
I do, however, agree with his assessment that the contemporary sociopolitical state’s legitimacy and regulative force is, in Searle’s words, “intentionally-relative,” that is, “people’s attitudes are necessary to constitute something as money, government, political parties, or final examinations.”[10]
Political agents accept the benefits of political life, i.e. protection, law, increased opportunity for a “good life,” in trade for the necessary burdens of such arrangements, including the state’s authority over aspects of their lives.[11] Foucault writes, “What can the end of government be? Certainly not just to govern, but to improve the condition of the population…”[12]
The ability to carve the space for oneself to realize, develop, and exercise personal power is relative to one’s relationship and standing to the society at large. The more power one holds over their choices and movements, the better the chances to fulfill one’s own particular ‘good life’, an important concern in liberal discourse.
This “pastoral” state, with the population its flock, contains the mechanisms for large-scale discipline of the individual body, where conformation to the expectations of the state was linked to the well-being and advancement of both individuals and the general population; the state as the sole means to the best end.[13]
I will return to these ideas in the Part Five.
Two more definitions necessary for upcoming discussions
Allow me to briefly step back and offer two definitions that will become of growing importance as we move forward. This discussion evolves and moves quick in this blog format, so I do not want to risk letting these definitions slip through the cracks.
First, I will use the term ‘System’ to describe “a group of interacting, interrelated, or interdependent elements in relationship to each other as to form a complex whole”.
Second, ‘Economic’ is “the system concerned with the structure of production, distribution, exchange, and consumption of goods, services, and resources in a society, including finances, labor, and institutional relations”.
Thank you and I will see you again in Chapter Three, Parts Five and Six.
In Part Five, I will begin discussing this notions of the pastoral state and “biopower,” as well as offering my definition of sociopolitical power. Five will also lead us towards Iris Young and her rejection of distributive theories of power and justice. Her rejection forms the base of my own model of Relational Materialism.
Part Six will delve into Searle and answer to some objections I have with his conclusions.
Footnotes
[1] Oshana (2003) pg. 102
[2] ibid. pg. 101
[3] Oshana, 2008, pg. 199
[4] Foucault (1990) pp. 96
[5] Young (1990) pp. 9
[6] Slogans, propaganda, the food pyramid, political primaries, nationalistic rhetoric and symbols.
[7] Imprisonment, penalties, sanctions, the death penalty, military presence at social demonstrations.
[8] Searle (2010). pp. 23 “the glue to hold civilization together,”[8]
[9] See Searle (2010) and Lukes (2004) This ability to reflect upon first-order desires, and then to act upon consequent second-level reasons, is a trait particular to humans and “distinguishes language-based rationality from rationality that does not require language.” Searle, pp. 128
[10] Searle (2010) pp. 17
[11]Such burdens include regulations, taxations, and limits to personal expression of power such as laws against stealing, yelling “fire” in theaters, traffic fines, slander, and so forth.
[12] Foucault, 2004, pp. 105
[13] “And the instruments that government will use to obtain these ends are, in a way, immanent to the field of population; it will be by acting directly, on the population itself through campaigns, or, indirectly, by, for example, techniques that, without people being aware of it, stimulate the birth rate, or direct the flows of population to this or that region or activity.” (2204, pp. 105)
Relational Materialism and Citizen X
Chapter Three - Part Three
In Chapter Three – Part Two, I concluded by saying that politics is primarily a matter of decision-making and is therefore a matter of Power.
This begs the question then: What do I mean by Power? Why capital ‘P’ Power as opposed to simply ‘power,’ and do I mean to make a distinction? Further, how does Power influence politics and decision-making in a Relational Materialist frame?
In Chapter Three – Part Three, I will begin to answer these questions and I will start with definitions of Power and power.
To begin…
To begin, I want to bring attention to my use of capital ‘P’ Power and draw a distinction between it and lower case power. My intention with this distinction is to differentiate a technical term Power from the more colloquial sense of power in common academic and literary uses.
My technical use of Power is similar to Husserl's technical use of Intention as opposed to intention. The technical use of ‘Intention’ is a specific phenomenological term used to describe the intangible aspects of our experience, where we use ‘intention’ in a more colloquial capacity.
All experiences are, phenomenologically speaking, Intended: they are Intentional, they are experienced as about some particular object in the Lifeworld. This is a separate idea from common ‘intentionality’, which is what we use when we say, “I intended to call you last night.” Here, intention is about what you want to do in the world, what action you so desired to exercise. As this is concerned with action, common intentionality is both internal and external, dealing with physical actions in the Lifeworld. In contrast, technical ‘Intentionality’ is purely internal: it is the experience of our connection to the Lifeworld, concerned with epistemology, not praxeology.
My technical use of Power is a similar notion. ‘Power’ is used to discuss the intangible aspects of our common conception of power and how it relates the phenomenological agent to the external world it experiences.
This will all become clearer as I explain my understanding of ‘Power’ and ‘power’, so allow me do that.
Defining power and Power.
The word ‘power’ derives from an older form of the French pouvoir, through the Latin posse, meaning “to be able to.” At its heart, power is a capacity, “to be able” to do something. It is an internal potential realized as material action within the world. An adequate phenomenological definition of ‘Power’ must account for the internal and external factors operative in any Lifeworld exercise of ‘power.’
My initial definition of ‘power’ is “an agent’s (1) capacity to act, an internal potential that manifests in actuality as an (2) intentional action involving (3) a dynamic relationship with the external world.
All expressions of power are intentional, that is, “directed at, or about, objects and states of affairs in the world.” Until the action realizing the intention occurs there is no exercise of power. The capacity remains, the exercise of action simply fails.
A Short Description of Citizen X’s Relation to the Lifeworld
- Citizen X is ontologically and epistemically distinct from the Lifeworld, this allows for X’s phenomenological experience.
- Citizen X’s epistemological experience is that it acts and reacts to the distinct Lifeworld, including itself.
- Citizen X’s ontological experience is that it acts and reacts in the distinct Lifeworld, including itself.
- Acting ‘to’ the Lifeworld, ‘towards’ it, is distinct from acting ‘in’ the Lifeworld and I am using Intentionality and Power to name this distinction.
- Colloquial ‘power’ and ‘intentionality’ are both concerned with the physical reality of direct experience, utilizing the basic ontological and epistemological distinction and 'experiencing’ it, active and alive, drawing together the inner and outer life in a moment of actual life.
- Citizen X, on the individual, or “personal” level, contains both tangible and intangible elements, and expressions of power result in definite and discreet physical artifacts, i.e., actions in a material world.
An Example
As mentioned, exercises of power occur in relation with the external world and this fact brings with it limitations to expressions of intentional action. First, as physical beings, basic physical limitations hinder our freedom to act in important ways. For example, our needs for nourishment and rest, as well as general bodily limitations such as having only two arms, two legs, no wings, no gills, the effects of aging, proneness to injury and so on: the body both produces and limits its own expressible power. In addition, the reality of different environments brings opportunities and obstacles such as weather, landscape, climate, and various geographical factors.
To explain, take something as simple as eating an apple.
Seeing an apple on a tree, an individual wants to pick and eat it. It is in her capacity to be able to do this. She can choose to pick the apple. It is within her ‘power’ to do so. In the colloquial sense just used, power refers to the individual capacity to meaningfully interact and to be an active force in the external world. An individual exercises her power when she reaches out and plucks the apple off the tree:[2] “power” describes how action manifests as well describing the force of the action itself. Until the action realizing the intention occurs there is no exercise of power.[3]
Common “power” describes how we are able to act, to make decisions and carry them out. Individual agents have the capacity for action, their own personal power, but the ability to actually exercise this power is a matter of contingent degree.
Returning to the apple example, an individual is hungry and so she intentionally expresses her power by reaching up, plucking an apple from the tree and eating it. However, things are not always so straightforward with our relationship to the external world. What if the apple is too high in the tree to reach, or what if the apple, when picked, turns out to be rotten, thus inedible?
In the examples given, I have described an agent’s ‘personal’ power, the capacity each individual carries to act in the world, to decide and carry through with some intentional action. The agent has “power to” pick and eat the apple, and she has “power over” her environment just in case she uses her personal power successfully.
If the apple is too high in the tree, her intention to pick and eat the apple is frustrated, her hunger grows, and her power over her environment becomes compromised. Of course, with ingenuity and inventiveness, she could overcome environmental limitations; say by building a ladder or perhaps working with another agent to secure her desired outcome.
There are countless examples of the manners that we succeed, fail, change desires, achieve unintended outcomes, and so forth, and ample literature on these subjects exists, however in the context of this blog, it is important to apply this discussion to the more philosophically important relationships between Citizen X and the Lifeworld, or in more practical terms, the relationship between any contemporary agent and the capital-based modern liberal state. [5]
Searle and One Last Thing
One last thing: Philosophical discussions of power generally concern either ‘power to’ or ‘power over.’ ‘Power to’ describes a capacity, an ability to act, where ‘power over’ describes power as external, involving control of one’s environment or getting other agents to behave in desired ways.[6]
John Searle shows this distinction by separating the capacity for power from its physical expression, logically distinguishing them by stating that ‘X has the power (is able, has the capacity) to do A’ does not include the relational quality, ‘X has the power over Y with respect to action A’ that an expression of power contains.[7] This means that exercises of power involve a second, external element, some Y, to exercise power over.
This relational aspect involves two general constraints Searle claims must be met to be a successful expression of power. The “exactness constraint” requires “one should be able to say, who exactly has power over whom to get them to do exactly what,” applicable even when the agent and subject of power are technically unknown to one another, such as a senator over her district.
Second, the “intentionality constraint” requires a specification of the intentional content of the exercise, the general motivation and direction of the agent’s actions. Colloquial intentionality is extended to cases where the threat or known option of an exercise of power is recognized, including not only the actual intentional content of the threat, but also the counterfactual specification of possible imposed sanctions, including political and economic exclusion or embargo, fines, imprisonment, being kicked out of your bridge club, detention, solitary confinement, and so on; the list of the degrees and types of ‘possible imposed sanctions’ is long and varied.
The core notion of political power for Searle is formalized as, “X has power over Y IFF X is able intentionally to get Y to behave in a certain way with respect to action A whether or not Y wants to behave that way.”[8]
Searle’s definitions of power will be returned to in the relative future. As we move forward, I will look at them from time to time and see what in them holds and what is shown to be insufficient.
Coming soon in Chapter Three: Part Four will pick up this discussion with the ideas of power and autonomy.
Footnotes (yes, I know there's no one or four - silly blog formatting)
[2] Searle (2010) pp. 146. Searle separates the capacity for power from its physical expression, logically distinguishing them by showing that “X has the power (is able, has the capacity) to do A” does not include the relational quality, “X has the power over Y with respect to action A” that an expression of power contains.
[3] When she reaches out and plucks the apple, she has exercised her power to do so, just as when she eats the apple she has exercised her power to eat the apple. If she wants to walk over to another tree, she likewise has the capacity to do so and exercises her power by doing it.
[5] By which I include both individual agents and more formal notions of ‘agent’ such as a social group or complainant in a court of law (i.e. Brown v. Board of Education).
[6] Searle, (2010), pp. 146
[7] ibid. pp. 146
[8] ibid. pp. 148
The Overall Plan of the Blog Series "The Value of Power"
Before releasing the next part of Chapter Three, I find it necessary, for my own organization and for my fear of you feeling organized while reading such a dispersed and drawn out blog-style philosophical tome, to give a general structure of the chapters and upcoming topics involved in the project.
So, subject to many changes of course, here is a general table of contents.
The Value of Power
Table of Contents
Chapter One: Evolution, Devolution, and Other Political Possibilities
Contains 3 parts and deals with the basic problems and ideas of meaningful political change.
Chapter Two: The Value of Autonomy in Relation to Personal Power - The Origins of Citizen X
Contains 5 parts and deals with the ontological and epistemic status of the politicized phenomenological agent.
Chapter Three: Relational Materialism and Citizen X
Contains 5 parts and deals with distribution, personal and political power and the ontology of the political state.
Chapter Four: Distribution and Political Justice in a Relational Materialist Frame
Contains 5 parts and deals with Iris Young's argument against distributive models and my reply to her argument.
Chapter Five: Domination and Dependence - The Value of Power
Contains 5 parts and deals with the role of power in the phenomenology of the political agent.
Chapter Six: Power and Resistance - The Value of Citizen X
Contains 5 parts and deals with resistance to oppressive political practices and assumptions.
Chapter Seven: Relational Materialism and Practical Theory
Contains 5 parts and deals with prescriptive measures and practical ideas for meaningful political change.
As mentioned, this is all subject to modification and updates as I move forward with this project.
My intention is to finish this blog series by early 2015. Once finished, I will take this blog, add to it, change and edit what needs to be changed and edited, and release the longer, more detailed, updated version in both print and ebook formats.
Thank you for your interest and I always appreciate your comments and thoughts.
Cheers, Viva, Devrim!!
David Edward Wagner
Before releasing the next part of Chapter Three, I find it necessary, for my own organization and for my fear of you feeling organized while reading such a dispersed and drawn out blog-style philosophical tome, to give a general structure of the chapters and upcoming topics involved in the project.
So, subject to many changes of course, here is a general table of contents.
The Value of Power
Table of Contents
Chapter One: Evolution, Devolution, and Other Political Possibilities
Contains 3 parts and deals with the basic problems and ideas of meaningful political change.
Chapter Two: The Value of Autonomy in Relation to Personal Power - The Origins of Citizen X
Contains 5 parts and deals with the ontological and epistemic status of the politicized phenomenological agent.
Chapter Three: Relational Materialism and Citizen X
Contains 5 parts and deals with distribution, personal and political power and the ontology of the political state.
Chapter Four: Distribution and Political Justice in a Relational Materialist Frame
Contains 5 parts and deals with Iris Young's argument against distributive models and my reply to her argument.
Chapter Five: Domination and Dependence - The Value of Power
Contains 5 parts and deals with the role of power in the phenomenology of the political agent.
Chapter Six: Power and Resistance - The Value of Citizen X
Contains 5 parts and deals with resistance to oppressive political practices and assumptions.
Chapter Seven: Relational Materialism and Practical Theory
Contains 5 parts and deals with prescriptive measures and practical ideas for meaningful political change.
As mentioned, this is all subject to modification and updates as I move forward with this project.
My intention is to finish this blog series by early 2015. Once finished, I will take this blog, add to it, change and edit what needs to be changed and edited, and release the longer, more detailed, updated version in both print and ebook formats.
Thank you for your interest and I always appreciate your comments and thoughts.
Cheers, Viva, Devrim!!
David Edward Wagner
Chapter Three
Part Two
Relational Materialism and Citizen X
In Part One of this chapter I made several large claims important to the upcoming discussions. Allow me to briefly summarize and categorize the main points.
Main Claims from Chapter Three- Part One
Phenomenology is the study of individual experience and this includes both the first person point of view of an experiencing “I” and the structure of the experience itself. All experiences are Intentional, a technical term meaning they are ‘directed at’ or ‘about’ something, most notably other experiencing individuals and the shared Lifeworld of culture, history, and belief.
While the discipline of phenomenology certainly has influenced political philosophy, a full systemic account of political philosophy in a phenomenological frame has not yet been developed. My project is to do just that for both theoretical and practical reasons.
To do this, I will base my argument around “Citizen X,” my term for the politicized phenomenological agent. Agency importantly involves embodied action in the external world while Politicization involves the inclusion of the experiencing individual as a member of some socio-political group and the structure supporting sociopolitical inclusion.
My phenomenological system is termed Relational Materialism and based on what I understand as a fundamental phenomenological relationship between agents, as both individuals and groups, and the sociopolitical state, I argue that sociopolitical power is usefully conceived within an alternative “distributive” model.
Now to move forward.
Moving Forward: An Alternative Distributive-based Model
In the past, distributive models/descriptions of social relations have been controversial and have been argued against by many philosophers including an important and influential argument against it by Iris Marion Young. As I move forward, I will use Young’s arguments explicitly in the construction of my own model. However, for now, the remainder of this blog entry will be devoted to explaining some of the intricacies of my account of distribution in contemporary liberal society.
To understand what I mean by my claim that “sociopolitical power is usefully conceived within an alternative distributive model,” two things must be explained.
First, what exactly is ‘distribution’ and what does it consist of?
Two, how does distribution fit with my phenomenological model of Relational Materialism.
Distribution
In general, distribution involves the division and allotment of material and immaterial goods, services, and resources within a given territory and population. A territory and its population is a broad definition of a contemporary sociopolitical state, and each state follows some particular distributive scheme.[1]
The primary purpose of any distributive system is to satisfy the wants, needs, and demands for services, goods, and resources within a territory.
“Services” are intangible economic activities, examples of which are haircuts, taxicabs, or ‘expertise’ such as visiting a doctor or a financial advisor.
Services contrast with “goods,” generally physical items that satisfy some want, utility, or need. More accurately, goods can be tangible (an apple, a car) or, increasingly, intangible, for example, information or news that is distributed through some physical instrument such as a newspaper or computer.
Goods that are limited relative to demand are termed ‘economic’ goods (cars, computers), contrasted with ‘free’ goods, goods needed by society and available without limit, such as water or air. However, clean air and water are more recently considered (controversially so) ‘common goods,’ as competition over them has become rivalrous.
Private goods can be privately owned, such as a car. Public goods, by contrast, are non-rivalrous; the light from a streetlight or national defense are examples.
From this all-too-brief distributive primer, I want to take three specific ideas.
First, it is not distorting or surprising to understand ‘goods,’ in a practical and academic sense, as intangibles, as actions manifested and marketed. Goods and services alike have recognized intangible elements adjoined to corresponding physical relationships. A massage is an idea and an action marketed and commodified in the form of merchandise, professionals, and specialists. “Taxi” is an idea made concrete in driver, car, and cab company.
Second, that values are created and that “valuing” relates directly to “devaluing.”
Third, that these intangible and manufactured elements of distribution are relational, that is, they occur in relationships between some particular agent and some external element. I will develop this claim further over the next several chapters.
Simple and Complex, Conceptual Idealism and Actual Realism
There are two broad views of the equal distribution of goods in a society: Simple and Complex. Though there are various arguments and camps within each of these schemes, they all fall within this basic delineation.
Simple Equality ideally demands goods are to be distributed evenly, in equal, uniform manners. Each individual gets the same amount of each ‘good’ in morally and materially considered ways; an egalitarian land of enough and as good as.
Complex equality says there is more to it than that. There are circumstances that have true effect on the egalitarian aspirations of our distributive system.
My understanding is that we, as embodied politicized phenomenological agents, or more simply, as “material agents” or just “agents,” exist in a material world where the structure of our sociopolitical requires, necessarily I might add, a complex description of distribution.
We do not live behind a Rawlsian veil that would blind us to differences in social station, background, assumption or convention, and we are not unencumbered by the realities that these differences present to us. We see who and what we are, and we are weighed down with the cumbersome accumulation of histories, decisions, social mores, and consequences.
Thus the ideal, that all social goods be distributed to the benefit of the least-advantaged member of the particular society, Rawls’ conception of the ‘Difference Principle,’ is an egalitarian response to the actuality of our complex social relations. It acknowledges that there is more to the heart of our situation than what can be salvaged from pragmatically untenable simple conceptions of absolute uniformity of distribution.
The locus of the political
Something important is brought to light with Rawls’ Difference Principle, something inherent in all sociopolitical theorizing including my own.
There is a fundamental distinction to be made between Ideal and Actual: it is an ontological difference of priority. The Ideal is a rational construct, it is a formalized construct of reasoned experience. Ideal theory asks for a priori categorization, how could things be if stripped of the actuality of material experience. It is a theory of concepts, a theory of theories. Passive and disconnected, Ideal theory is the theory of the concept of theories.
The Actual, in contrast, is the theory of the concept of action. It is materially based, embodied, the experience itself, not the categorization of the experience. Actual theory is ontologically based in the phenomonologcal world, the world of experience and the structures of experience. It is therefore active; it is the act of experiencing.
Ideal theory is ontologically based in the deliberations and judgments of the phenomenological consciousness, logically subsequent to and comparatively more passive than the act of the experience itself.
The Actual is prior to the Ideal, it is what brings the ideal to being. It is ontologically prior in two ways. One, that a “material agent” must exist and sustain considerable experience before conceptual categorization can occur. Two, that the “material world” exists independently from the agent and it is the agent’s coming into being and out of being within this external ‘lifeworld’ that frames the accumulation of ideal concepts.
A common element in contemporary liberal theory is exemplified by Rawls’ principle of equalizing social differentiations, that as veiled and unencumbered agents, we can ask that our political paradigm be legitimated with the Ideal as the ontological starting point.
The Ideal is a proper place for postulating and theorizing, but the actual drafting of our practices should not come from an ideal vantage point. The questions of Idealism are commonly “how” and “why,” Rawls’ own question was how can we create an equality of distribution because some people have nothing while others have too much.
However, before answers to “how” and “why” can be meaningfully solved there is a prior question that needs dealing with. “How can we become equal and move closer to the ultimate level playing field” depends first on the prior inquiry: “what is causing the disharmonious relationships in our systems, economic, political, and social, and what actual decisions can we recognize as disharmonious to the whole, and can therefore choose to change in fundamental ways?”
This is a question of Actual theory, of Realism, of material concern.
As I want to wrap up this blog entry at the fear of running too long and/or digressing too fully, I want to make one more summarizing statement and then conclude.
Relational Materialism is Actual theory, ontologically based in the active world of experience. The sociopolitical questions I want to raise deal with the activity of experiencing agents and the Lifeworld we have created.
Before any type of prescriptive/descriptive analysis of "why" any particular capital-based liberal state is facing the contemporary problems it faces or "how" those problems can be alleviated, the questions of “what is a contemporary state qua state,” and “what is the structure of a state qua state” must both be answered.
Those two questions will form the bulk of the next many months of my philosophy blog entries.
As I mentioned previously, a state is a political entity and ‘politics’ deals importantly with decision making. Thus, as I will begin to discuss in the very next entry, Politics is a matter of Power: power in the society we have constructed and live in, power in relation to the power of others, in relation to our own histories and our shared experiences, power in relation to other necessary social goods: nourishment, shelter, health, security and, perhaps, a good life. And these things are, to be certain, fundamentally political concerns.
As always, I encourage you to leave comments, to argue and ask, as I may have very well skipped over things, not explained things, or otherwise not clarified myself. Also, perhaps you don't agree or maybe you even do, for whatever reason at all, I hope you feel free to comment and continue the discussion.
Footnotes
[1] The United States utilizes a mixed distributive scheme and economy, blending elements of a free, unrestrained, privately owned capitalist market with state-owned public goods and regulatory measures.
Part Two
Relational Materialism and Citizen X
In Part One of this chapter I made several large claims important to the upcoming discussions. Allow me to briefly summarize and categorize the main points.
Main Claims from Chapter Three- Part One
Phenomenology is the study of individual experience and this includes both the first person point of view of an experiencing “I” and the structure of the experience itself. All experiences are Intentional, a technical term meaning they are ‘directed at’ or ‘about’ something, most notably other experiencing individuals and the shared Lifeworld of culture, history, and belief.
While the discipline of phenomenology certainly has influenced political philosophy, a full systemic account of political philosophy in a phenomenological frame has not yet been developed. My project is to do just that for both theoretical and practical reasons.
To do this, I will base my argument around “Citizen X,” my term for the politicized phenomenological agent. Agency importantly involves embodied action in the external world while Politicization involves the inclusion of the experiencing individual as a member of some socio-political group and the structure supporting sociopolitical inclusion.
My phenomenological system is termed Relational Materialism and based on what I understand as a fundamental phenomenological relationship between agents, as both individuals and groups, and the sociopolitical state, I argue that sociopolitical power is usefully conceived within an alternative “distributive” model.
Now to move forward.
Moving Forward: An Alternative Distributive-based Model
In the past, distributive models/descriptions of social relations have been controversial and have been argued against by many philosophers including an important and influential argument against it by Iris Marion Young. As I move forward, I will use Young’s arguments explicitly in the construction of my own model. However, for now, the remainder of this blog entry will be devoted to explaining some of the intricacies of my account of distribution in contemporary liberal society.
To understand what I mean by my claim that “sociopolitical power is usefully conceived within an alternative distributive model,” two things must be explained.
First, what exactly is ‘distribution’ and what does it consist of?
Two, how does distribution fit with my phenomenological model of Relational Materialism.
Distribution
In general, distribution involves the division and allotment of material and immaterial goods, services, and resources within a given territory and population. A territory and its population is a broad definition of a contemporary sociopolitical state, and each state follows some particular distributive scheme.[1]
The primary purpose of any distributive system is to satisfy the wants, needs, and demands for services, goods, and resources within a territory.
“Services” are intangible economic activities, examples of which are haircuts, taxicabs, or ‘expertise’ such as visiting a doctor or a financial advisor.
Services contrast with “goods,” generally physical items that satisfy some want, utility, or need. More accurately, goods can be tangible (an apple, a car) or, increasingly, intangible, for example, information or news that is distributed through some physical instrument such as a newspaper or computer.
Goods that are limited relative to demand are termed ‘economic’ goods (cars, computers), contrasted with ‘free’ goods, goods needed by society and available without limit, such as water or air. However, clean air and water are more recently considered (controversially so) ‘common goods,’ as competition over them has become rivalrous.
Private goods can be privately owned, such as a car. Public goods, by contrast, are non-rivalrous; the light from a streetlight or national defense are examples.
From this all-too-brief distributive primer, I want to take three specific ideas.
First, it is not distorting or surprising to understand ‘goods,’ in a practical and academic sense, as intangibles, as actions manifested and marketed. Goods and services alike have recognized intangible elements adjoined to corresponding physical relationships. A massage is an idea and an action marketed and commodified in the form of merchandise, professionals, and specialists. “Taxi” is an idea made concrete in driver, car, and cab company.
Second, that values are created and that “valuing” relates directly to “devaluing.”
Third, that these intangible and manufactured elements of distribution are relational, that is, they occur in relationships between some particular agent and some external element. I will develop this claim further over the next several chapters.
Simple and Complex, Conceptual Idealism and Actual Realism
There are two broad views of the equal distribution of goods in a society: Simple and Complex. Though there are various arguments and camps within each of these schemes, they all fall within this basic delineation.
Simple Equality ideally demands goods are to be distributed evenly, in equal, uniform manners. Each individual gets the same amount of each ‘good’ in morally and materially considered ways; an egalitarian land of enough and as good as.
Complex equality says there is more to it than that. There are circumstances that have true effect on the egalitarian aspirations of our distributive system.
My understanding is that we, as embodied politicized phenomenological agents, or more simply, as “material agents” or just “agents,” exist in a material world where the structure of our sociopolitical requires, necessarily I might add, a complex description of distribution.
We do not live behind a Rawlsian veil that would blind us to differences in social station, background, assumption or convention, and we are not unencumbered by the realities that these differences present to us. We see who and what we are, and we are weighed down with the cumbersome accumulation of histories, decisions, social mores, and consequences.
Thus the ideal, that all social goods be distributed to the benefit of the least-advantaged member of the particular society, Rawls’ conception of the ‘Difference Principle,’ is an egalitarian response to the actuality of our complex social relations. It acknowledges that there is more to the heart of our situation than what can be salvaged from pragmatically untenable simple conceptions of absolute uniformity of distribution.
The locus of the political
Something important is brought to light with Rawls’ Difference Principle, something inherent in all sociopolitical theorizing including my own.
There is a fundamental distinction to be made between Ideal and Actual: it is an ontological difference of priority. The Ideal is a rational construct, it is a formalized construct of reasoned experience. Ideal theory asks for a priori categorization, how could things be if stripped of the actuality of material experience. It is a theory of concepts, a theory of theories. Passive and disconnected, Ideal theory is the theory of the concept of theories.
The Actual, in contrast, is the theory of the concept of action. It is materially based, embodied, the experience itself, not the categorization of the experience. Actual theory is ontologically based in the phenomonologcal world, the world of experience and the structures of experience. It is therefore active; it is the act of experiencing.
Ideal theory is ontologically based in the deliberations and judgments of the phenomenological consciousness, logically subsequent to and comparatively more passive than the act of the experience itself.
The Actual is prior to the Ideal, it is what brings the ideal to being. It is ontologically prior in two ways. One, that a “material agent” must exist and sustain considerable experience before conceptual categorization can occur. Two, that the “material world” exists independently from the agent and it is the agent’s coming into being and out of being within this external ‘lifeworld’ that frames the accumulation of ideal concepts.
A common element in contemporary liberal theory is exemplified by Rawls’ principle of equalizing social differentiations, that as veiled and unencumbered agents, we can ask that our political paradigm be legitimated with the Ideal as the ontological starting point.
The Ideal is a proper place for postulating and theorizing, but the actual drafting of our practices should not come from an ideal vantage point. The questions of Idealism are commonly “how” and “why,” Rawls’ own question was how can we create an equality of distribution because some people have nothing while others have too much.
However, before answers to “how” and “why” can be meaningfully solved there is a prior question that needs dealing with. “How can we become equal and move closer to the ultimate level playing field” depends first on the prior inquiry: “what is causing the disharmonious relationships in our systems, economic, political, and social, and what actual decisions can we recognize as disharmonious to the whole, and can therefore choose to change in fundamental ways?”
This is a question of Actual theory, of Realism, of material concern.
As I want to wrap up this blog entry at the fear of running too long and/or digressing too fully, I want to make one more summarizing statement and then conclude.
Relational Materialism is Actual theory, ontologically based in the active world of experience. The sociopolitical questions I want to raise deal with the activity of experiencing agents and the Lifeworld we have created.
Before any type of prescriptive/descriptive analysis of "why" any particular capital-based liberal state is facing the contemporary problems it faces or "how" those problems can be alleviated, the questions of “what is a contemporary state qua state,” and “what is the structure of a state qua state” must both be answered.
Those two questions will form the bulk of the next many months of my philosophy blog entries.
As I mentioned previously, a state is a political entity and ‘politics’ deals importantly with decision making. Thus, as I will begin to discuss in the very next entry, Politics is a matter of Power: power in the society we have constructed and live in, power in relation to the power of others, in relation to our own histories and our shared experiences, power in relation to other necessary social goods: nourishment, shelter, health, security and, perhaps, a good life. And these things are, to be certain, fundamentally political concerns.
As always, I encourage you to leave comments, to argue and ask, as I may have very well skipped over things, not explained things, or otherwise not clarified myself. Also, perhaps you don't agree or maybe you even do, for whatever reason at all, I hope you feel free to comment and continue the discussion.
Footnotes
[1] The United States utilizes a mixed distributive scheme and economy, blending elements of a free, unrestrained, privately owned capitalist market with state-owned public goods and regulatory measures.
Chapter Three
Part One
Relational Materialism and Citizen X
Introduction
In this blog entry, I will begin discussing the idea of and need for a phenomenological model of political philosophy. I will also begin explaining the structure of Citizen X, the politicized subjective agent, and the details of X’s relationship with the external world.
What is a phenomenological model of political philosophy? This is a good question. First, a few concepts and ideas:
- The core notion of Phenomenology is that it is the study (logos) of phenomena (appearance of things, things as they appear to us in our experience, the ways we experience them). Put simply, it is the study of experience and the structure of that experience.
- Importantly, Phenomenology studies experience from a subjective and first person point of view (I do, I see, to my left, beside me, etc.).
- Phenomenology studies the structure of various types of experience including perception, thought, memory, imagination, emotion, desire, volition to body awareness, embodied action, and social activity including linguistic activity.
- The structure of an experience involves its Intentionality, its being directed towards something, the simple fact that it is an experience of or about some object. In phenomenology, Intentionality is a technical term and should not be confused with the more standard idea we have of intention.
- Concerning Intentionality, Husserl claimed that our conscious experience is directed towards (represents, ‘intends’) objects/things only through particular concepts thoughts, ideas, images, etc. These make up the ‘meaning’ or ‘content’ of a given experience and they are distinct from the things they present or mean. So, the tree you see in the park is distinct from the general concept of ‘tree’.
- The idea of ‘Lifeworld’: Intersubjectivity (relations between agents) forms the basis of the shared external lifeworld (as termed by Husserl). The lifeworld can be thought of in two ways. One, in the beliefs of the single agent, the rational structure underlying their everyday experience, the beliefs against which his/her everyday attitude towards him/her self, the objective world, and other agents receive their ultimate justification. Two, as the full realm of socially, culturally, or evolutionarily established concepts of general structure (motion, spatial shapes, causality) that groups or collectives of agents conceive of their world through. This includes language and the basic shared nature of a common external world that allows translation of languages and ideas between historically or culturally distinct lifeworlds.
- The two leading figures in the formation of the phenomenological method and discipline, Husserl and Heidegger, utilized distinct approaches. Briefly, the bulk of Husserl’s work concerned transcendental phenomenology and was epistemological in nature (concerning knowledge and the cogito), while Heidegger’s work concerned a more existential phenomenology that was ontological in nature (concerning being).
These ideas will be discussed in greater detail as we move forward in this blog series and they are presented here briefly to simply get us going. Please feel free to ask questions, add your own ideas, or whatever you want in the form of comments. I look forward to them.
My notion of Citizen X
To explain what I want to do by formalizing a systemic phenomenological account of political philosophy, I must first add the basics of my conception of Citizen X to the all-to-brief phenomenology primer given above.
Citizen X is the ‘politicized phenomenological agent.’ This description has three components, so let us look quickly at each with the promise of getting into greater depth and detail in the course of this multi-blog entry chapter.
I understand “agency” as the capacity to make and impose choices in the world; an agent is one who acts. This action, as fundamentally a capacity, is ontologically based in the phenomenological subject, the individual, the “agent” who may only act to the extent that she is able to with self-deliberation and empowerment. Ideally, an “agent” maintains the capacity to express her personal power with no limitations and with complete self-authored deliberation.
However, as described in Chapter Two of this blog series, practical limitations to “agency” exist in the simple fact of physical and social reality, and acknowledgement of these empirical conditions negates the usefulness of ideal theories, requiring practical theory to base itself in material paradigms.
A phenomenological agent is an experiencing agent, a subjective consciousness with a first person point of view of the external world around him/her, including other subjective agents.
Since the phenomenological experience is embodied, it occurs through a physical, living, existing conscious body, I feel the proper term to describe the embodied experience is through the concept of the "phenomenological agent."
Finally, the ‘Political’ refers to the processes of social relations: decision-making, state action, power structures, and the cultural habits, assumptions, and practices of distinct and diverse communities.
‘Politicized’ then means the action, process, or result of making something political. In this case, it is the action, process, or result of making the subjective phenomenological agent into a political being.
In my conception of a phenomenological system of political philosophy, I understand two main ideas. One, that an individual experience of the external world necessarily involves both transcendental (a priori, intangible) structure and materialistic (a posteriori, tangible) structure. Two, that both the transcendental and materialistic aspects of any experience are affected by and effect the politicization of the shared external world.
What is the need for a phenomenological system of political philosophy?
A limit has been reached in political philosophy, and this limit, I claim, is exposed in the growing body of research based in “relational” paradigms, examples of which I include, among others, Michel Foucault, Iris Young, Marina Oshana, and Judith Butler. I do not claim these authors necessarily agree or always share views, however I understand that the basic mechanism at work in each one’s general theory as “relation-based.” Further, in this relational model it is stressed that these relationships, in the sociopolitical context, fundamentally have become domineering and oppressive.
By emphasizing the material context of oppressive relationships of sociopolitical power, I understand that every exercise of power has three elements, the capacity to act, the actual exercised action, and some form or forms of resistance to the exercise. The capacity to act hinges on the phenomenology of the agent, how her experience is structured as a conscious “I.” This in turn hinges on the agent’s relation to the external world. The choices and actions an agent recognizes as open to her are deeply shaped by sociopolitical conditions, that is, the conditions concerning an agent’s social and political circumstances.
Based on what I understand as a fundamental phenomenological relationship between agents, as both individuals and groups, and the sociopolitical state, I argue that sociopolitical power is usefully conceived in an alternative “distributive” model, termed “relational materialism.” Distribution involves materially satisfying the needs and wants of a populace in any social arrangement. Two important mechanisms are involved in the action of distribution at the sociopolitical scale, control and valuation. I argue that these mechanisms are not necessarily oppressive. However, in the contemporary liberal state, the systemic abuse of these mechanisms by capital-based liberal ideology results in a deep and diverse normatively justified state of sociopolitical domination.
These ideas then will be the guiding motivations and directions future entries in this blog series will take, beginning with the upcoming Chapter Three Part Two where I discuss the concept and problems of Power. I will talk about personal and socio-political power as well as going into my conception of Citizen X in greater detail.
Please leave your comments, questions, or the like in the comment section. I look forward to starting a meaningful dialog with you all.
Part One
Relational Materialism and Citizen X
Introduction
In this blog entry, I will begin discussing the idea of and need for a phenomenological model of political philosophy. I will also begin explaining the structure of Citizen X, the politicized subjective agent, and the details of X’s relationship with the external world.
What is a phenomenological model of political philosophy? This is a good question. First, a few concepts and ideas:
- The core notion of Phenomenology is that it is the study (logos) of phenomena (appearance of things, things as they appear to us in our experience, the ways we experience them). Put simply, it is the study of experience and the structure of that experience.
- Importantly, Phenomenology studies experience from a subjective and first person point of view (I do, I see, to my left, beside me, etc.).
- Phenomenology studies the structure of various types of experience including perception, thought, memory, imagination, emotion, desire, volition to body awareness, embodied action, and social activity including linguistic activity.
- The structure of an experience involves its Intentionality, its being directed towards something, the simple fact that it is an experience of or about some object. In phenomenology, Intentionality is a technical term and should not be confused with the more standard idea we have of intention.
- Concerning Intentionality, Husserl claimed that our conscious experience is directed towards (represents, ‘intends’) objects/things only through particular concepts thoughts, ideas, images, etc. These make up the ‘meaning’ or ‘content’ of a given experience and they are distinct from the things they present or mean. So, the tree you see in the park is distinct from the general concept of ‘tree’.
- The idea of ‘Lifeworld’: Intersubjectivity (relations between agents) forms the basis of the shared external lifeworld (as termed by Husserl). The lifeworld can be thought of in two ways. One, in the beliefs of the single agent, the rational structure underlying their everyday experience, the beliefs against which his/her everyday attitude towards him/her self, the objective world, and other agents receive their ultimate justification. Two, as the full realm of socially, culturally, or evolutionarily established concepts of general structure (motion, spatial shapes, causality) that groups or collectives of agents conceive of their world through. This includes language and the basic shared nature of a common external world that allows translation of languages and ideas between historically or culturally distinct lifeworlds.
- The two leading figures in the formation of the phenomenological method and discipline, Husserl and Heidegger, utilized distinct approaches. Briefly, the bulk of Husserl’s work concerned transcendental phenomenology and was epistemological in nature (concerning knowledge and the cogito), while Heidegger’s work concerned a more existential phenomenology that was ontological in nature (concerning being).
These ideas will be discussed in greater detail as we move forward in this blog series and they are presented here briefly to simply get us going. Please feel free to ask questions, add your own ideas, or whatever you want in the form of comments. I look forward to them.
My notion of Citizen X
To explain what I want to do by formalizing a systemic phenomenological account of political philosophy, I must first add the basics of my conception of Citizen X to the all-to-brief phenomenology primer given above.
Citizen X is the ‘politicized phenomenological agent.’ This description has three components, so let us look quickly at each with the promise of getting into greater depth and detail in the course of this multi-blog entry chapter.
I understand “agency” as the capacity to make and impose choices in the world; an agent is one who acts. This action, as fundamentally a capacity, is ontologically based in the phenomenological subject, the individual, the “agent” who may only act to the extent that she is able to with self-deliberation and empowerment. Ideally, an “agent” maintains the capacity to express her personal power with no limitations and with complete self-authored deliberation.
However, as described in Chapter Two of this blog series, practical limitations to “agency” exist in the simple fact of physical and social reality, and acknowledgement of these empirical conditions negates the usefulness of ideal theories, requiring practical theory to base itself in material paradigms.
A phenomenological agent is an experiencing agent, a subjective consciousness with a first person point of view of the external world around him/her, including other subjective agents.
Since the phenomenological experience is embodied, it occurs through a physical, living, existing conscious body, I feel the proper term to describe the embodied experience is through the concept of the "phenomenological agent."
Finally, the ‘Political’ refers to the processes of social relations: decision-making, state action, power structures, and the cultural habits, assumptions, and practices of distinct and diverse communities.
‘Politicized’ then means the action, process, or result of making something political. In this case, it is the action, process, or result of making the subjective phenomenological agent into a political being.
In my conception of a phenomenological system of political philosophy, I understand two main ideas. One, that an individual experience of the external world necessarily involves both transcendental (a priori, intangible) structure and materialistic (a posteriori, tangible) structure. Two, that both the transcendental and materialistic aspects of any experience are affected by and effect the politicization of the shared external world.
What is the need for a phenomenological system of political philosophy?
A limit has been reached in political philosophy, and this limit, I claim, is exposed in the growing body of research based in “relational” paradigms, examples of which I include, among others, Michel Foucault, Iris Young, Marina Oshana, and Judith Butler. I do not claim these authors necessarily agree or always share views, however I understand that the basic mechanism at work in each one’s general theory as “relation-based.” Further, in this relational model it is stressed that these relationships, in the sociopolitical context, fundamentally have become domineering and oppressive.
By emphasizing the material context of oppressive relationships of sociopolitical power, I understand that every exercise of power has three elements, the capacity to act, the actual exercised action, and some form or forms of resistance to the exercise. The capacity to act hinges on the phenomenology of the agent, how her experience is structured as a conscious “I.” This in turn hinges on the agent’s relation to the external world. The choices and actions an agent recognizes as open to her are deeply shaped by sociopolitical conditions, that is, the conditions concerning an agent’s social and political circumstances.
Based on what I understand as a fundamental phenomenological relationship between agents, as both individuals and groups, and the sociopolitical state, I argue that sociopolitical power is usefully conceived in an alternative “distributive” model, termed “relational materialism.” Distribution involves materially satisfying the needs and wants of a populace in any social arrangement. Two important mechanisms are involved in the action of distribution at the sociopolitical scale, control and valuation. I argue that these mechanisms are not necessarily oppressive. However, in the contemporary liberal state, the systemic abuse of these mechanisms by capital-based liberal ideology results in a deep and diverse normatively justified state of sociopolitical domination.
These ideas then will be the guiding motivations and directions future entries in this blog series will take, beginning with the upcoming Chapter Three Part Two where I discuss the concept and problems of Power. I will talk about personal and socio-political power as well as going into my conception of Citizen X in greater detail.
Please leave your comments, questions, or the like in the comment section. I look forward to starting a meaningful dialog with you all.
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Sept. 5th, 2017
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